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ABSTRACT 
 
  This paper studies how the assumption of quasi-geometric (quasi-
hyperbolic) discounting affects the individual consumption-savings behavior in 
the context of the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model with 
heterogeneous agents. The agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and face 
borrowing constraints. We confine attention to an interior Markov recursive 
equilibrium. The consequence of quasi-geometric discounting is that the effective 
discount factor of an agent is not a constant, but an endogenous variable which 
depends on the agent's current state. We show, both analytically and by 
simulation, that this feature of the model can significantly affect its distributional 
implications. 
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 1 Introduction
Quasi-geometric (quasi-hyperbolic) discounting is a speciﬁcf o r mo ft i m e -
inconsistency in preferences when the discount factor, applied between today
and tomorrow, is diﬀerent from the one, used on all dates advanced further
in the future. The ﬁrst studies on quasi-geometric discounting date back to
Strotz (1955-1956), Pollak (1968), and Phelps and Pollak (1968), although
interest in this subject has revived recently, e.g., Laibson (1997), Laibson,
Repetto and Tobacman (1998), Barro (1999), Harris and Laibson (2001),
K r u s e l la n dS m i t h( 2 0 0 0 ,2 0 0 3 ) ,K r u s e l l ,K u r u ¸ sçu and Smith (2002), Luttmer
and Mariotti (2002).
This paper studies the quantitative implications of a heterogeneous-agent
general-equilibrium extension of Harris and Laibson’s (2001) model. We
speciﬁcally consider a version of the standard one-sector neoclassical growth
model with a continuum of quasi-geometric agents who are subject to id-
iosyncratic labor productivity shocks and who face borrowing constraints.
We conﬁne attention to an interior Markov recursive solution to the individ-
ual utility maximization problem. We focus on a stationary equilibrium such
that the prices of capital and labor are consistent with the optimal decisions
of agents, as in Aiyagari (1994).
With the assumption of quasi-geometric discounting, the eﬀective dis-
count factor of an agent is not a constant, but an endogenous variable which
depends on the agent’s current state. In particular, if the consumption func-
tion is strictly concave, then the eﬀective discount factor of the short-run
impatient agent is increasing in wealth. As a result, the rich are more patient
than the poor, so that the model with quasi-geometric short-run impatient
agents produces a larger dispersion of wealth than the standard setup where
the rich and the poor are equally patient. This implication is of interest
given that the standard model with a constant discount factor dramatically
underpredicts the size of wealth inequality relative to the data, e.g., Quadrini
and Rios-Rull (1997).
In a calibrated version of the model, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects associated
with the assumption of quasi-geometric discounting are quantitatively signiﬁ-
cant. For example, in our benchmark model with short-run impatient agents,
the wealth holdings of the bottom 40% of the population decline by 29%,t h e
3wealth holdings of the top 1% increase by 13%,a n dt h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient of the
wealth distribution increases by 18% compared to the standard geometric-
discounting setup. These improvements are however too small for the model
to reproduce the size of wealth inequality observed in the data. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that, in our general equilibrium model, the size of precautionary sav-
ings is not substantially aﬀected by the presence of quasi-geometric discount-
ing. This is contrary to what Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998) have
obtained in a partial equilibrium setup.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the
model, derives the optimality conditions and discusses some of the model’s
implications. Section 3 describes the methodology of the quantitative study
and presents the results from simulations, and ﬁnally, Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ T, where T = {0,1,2,...}.
The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents with
names on a closed interval [0,1]. The agents inelastically supply their total
time endowment (equal to one) to the market. The labor productivities of
the agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. The shocks follow a ﬁrst-
order Markov process and are uncorrelated across the agents. All possible
realizations of productivity shocks are in the set S =[ smin,s max] ⊂ R+.A t
each point of time, the agents also diﬀer in asset holdings, which somehow
summarize information on past realizations of shocks. Assets are restricted
to be in the set A =[ −b,∞) ⊂ R. That is, the agents are only allowed to
borrow up to a certain limit b.
In every period t ∈ T, an agent seeks to maximize the expected present
value of the sum of one-period utilities from t f o r w a r db yc h o o s i n ga no p t i m a l
path for consumption. The agent discounts the future by using the quasi-
geometric weights. Speciﬁcally, in period t, the agent puts the weight 1 on
the utility of period t and the weight βδ
τ+1−t on the utility of each period
τ >t , where the discounting parameters β and δ are such that β > 0 and
0 < δ < 1. Consequently, at each date t ∈ T, the agent solves the following
problem
max
{cτ,aτ+1}∞
τ=t
 
u(ct)+Et
∞  
τ=t
βδ
τ+1−tu(cτ+1)
 
(1)
4subject to
cτ + aτ+1 = wsτ +( 1+r)aτ, (2)
aτ+1 ≥− b, (3)
where initial condition (at,s t) is given. Here, cτ, aτ and sτ are consumption,
asset holdings and the labor productivity shock, respectively; r is the interest
rate; w i st h ew a g ep e ru n i to fe ﬃciency labor; Eτ is the expectation, con-
ditional on all information about the agent’s idiosyncratic shocks available
at τ. The momentary utility function u(c) is continuously diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes lim
c→0 u  (c)=∞.1
If β < 1, the short-run discount factor βδ is lower than the long-run
discount factor δ. The agent plans to save much in the future, however,
as the future comes around, she changes her mind and saves less than she
would have originally committed to if commitment was available. This case
is often referred to in the literature, as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, because
of a qualitative similarity with the case, where the discount factor is given
by an increasing-over-time generalized hyperbolic function (1 + αt)
−ν/α,w i t h
α,ν > 0.I fβ > 1, then the situation is reversed: the agent consumes less in
the future than she would have committed to. As argued in Hall (1998), both
alternatives, β < 1 and β > 1, are plausible. Following Krusell and Smith
(2000), we will refer to both cases, β < 1 and β > 1, as quasi-geometric
discounting: except for the current date, the weights on momentary utility
functions decline geometrically.
As argued in the literature, e.g., Laibson (1997), one can view a quasi-
geometric consumer in diﬀerent periods as a collection of temporal selves,
who play an inﬁnite-horizon game. Each self t has the preferences deﬁned
over the stream of consumption {cτ}
∞
τ=t and solves the problem (1) − (3).
We focus on the case when self t only has a direct control over the current
consumption, ct, i.e., the agent cannot commit herself to future actions.
The production side of the economy consists of the representative ﬁrm.
Given the factor prices r and w,t h eﬁrm rents capital Kt and hires labor
Nt to maximize period-by-period proﬁts. The technology is described by
F (Kt,N t)+( 1− d)Kt. The production function F has constant returns to
1We do not impose the nonnegativity of consumption explicitly because it is guaranteed
by the assumption lim
c→0
u  (c)=∞.
5scale, is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously diﬀerentiable and
satisﬁes the appropriate Inada conditions. The depreciation rate of capital
is d ∈ (0,1].
2.1 Recursive formulation and the Euler equation
As shown in Harris and Laibson (2001), the problem (1)−(3) can be written
recursively. To be speciﬁc, let us assume that in all periods, the agent decides
on consumption according to the same consumption function, ct = C (at,s t).
Then, without time subscripts, we have the following recursive formulation:
W (a,s)=m a x
c {u(c)+βδE [V (a
 ,s
 ) | s]}, (4)
where given (a,s), the value function V solves the functional equation
V (a,s)=u[C (a,s)] + δE {V [ws+( 1+r)a − C (a,s);s
 ] | s} (5)
subject to the budget constraint
a
  = ws +( 1+r)a − c (6)
and the borrowing constraint
a
  ≥− b. (7)
The problem (4)−(7) is to be solved for the unknown value functions W (a,s),
V (a,s) and the consumption function C (a,s). We assume that the above
functions are continuous and diﬀerentiable. These assumptions will be in
force throughout the remainder of the paper.
The value functions W (at,s t) and V (at,s t) show how the agent values
the assets a in periods t and t − 1, respectively. Under standard geometric
discounting (β =1 ) ,t h ev a l u eo fat in period t i st h es a m ea si np e r i o dt−1,
so that W (at,s t) and V (at,s t) coincide. Under quasi-geometric discounting
(β  =1 ) , the values of the assets at at t and t−1 are not equal and neither are
W (at,s t) and V (at,s t). This is precisely what time inconsistency means.
If the problem (4) − (7) has an interior solution, then such a solution
satisﬁes the quasi-geometric Euler equation:
u
  (ct) ≥ δEt {u
  (ct+1)[1+r − (1 − β) · C1 (at+1,s t+1)]}, (8)
6where u  is the derivative of the utility function u,a n dC1 is the ﬁrst-order
partial derivative of the consumption function C with respect to the ﬁrst
argument. The Euler equation holds with strict inequality if the borrowing
limit is reached. We assume that the solution to the Euler equation exists
and is unique.2
2.2 Equilibrium
Let x be a probability measure deﬁned on B, where B denotes the Borel
subset of the set of all possible individual states A×S. For all B ∈ B,x t (B)
is the mass of agents whose individual states lie in B at time t. Given that
xt i sap r o b a b i l i t ym e a s u r e ,t h et o t a lm a s so fa g e n t si se q u a lt o1.
Denote by P (a,s,B) the conditional probability that an agent with state
(a,s) will have an individual state lying in set B in the next period. The
function P is deﬁned as
P (a,s,B)=Prob({s
  ∈ S :[ A(a,s),s
 ] ∈ B}|s),
where A(a,s) ≡ a  = ws +( 1+r)a − C (a,s) is the decision function for
assets (the asset function). Then, the law of motion of xt is: xt+1 (B)=  
A×S P (a,s,B)dxt for all t ∈ T and all B ∈ B.
Labor and capital inputs are given by the sum of eﬃciency units of labor
supplied by all workers, Nt =
 
A×S stdxt, and the sum of assets held by all
agents, Kt =
 
A×S atdxt, respectively.
The fact that there is a continuum of agents guarantees that the mass of
agents with the shock s at t and the shock s  at t−1 is equal to the conditional
probability, Prob(s | s ). Since labor productivity shock follows a ﬁrst-order
Markov process, such probability depends only on the recent past and is the
same in all periods. Hence, Nt is a constant. For convenience, we normalize
it to one, N =1 .
We only study such equilibria in which the period-t+1probability mea-
sure xt+1 i st h es a m ea st h ep e r i o d - t probability measure xt, for all t ∈ T.
2It has been shown in the literature that the assumption of quasi-geometric discounting
can lead to non-monotonic or discontinuous decision rules (Harris and Laibson, 2001) and
to multiple equilibria (Krusell and Smith, 2000). It appears however that the interior
equilibrium (the one satisfying the Euler equation) is unique (see Krusell, Kuru¸ sçu and
Smith, 2002, for a discussion).
7In this case, we say that the probability measure is stationary and denote
it by x∗. The stationarity of x∗ implies that the aggregate capital stock is
constant, K =
 
A×S atdx∗ for all t ∈ T (even though the assets of each agent
vary stochastically over time).
Deﬁnition. A stationary equilibrium is deﬁned as a stationary probabil-
ity measure x∗, an optimal consumption function C (a,s), and positive real
numbers (K,r,w) such that
(1) x∗ satisﬁes x∗ =
 
A×S P (a,s,B)dx∗ for all B ∈ B;
(2) C (a,s) solves the Euler equation (8) for a given pair of prices (r,w);
(3) (r,w) are such that the ﬁrm’s proﬁti sm a x i m u m
r = F1 (K,1) − dw = F2 (K,1),
where F1 and F2 are the ﬁrst-order partial derivatives of the production
function F with respect to capital and labor inputs, respectively;
(4) K is the average of the agents’ decisions: K =
 
A×S A(a,s)dx∗.
2.3 Model’s implications
Under the assumption of standard geometric discounting, (β =1 ) , the dis-
count factor is a constant, equal to δ in all periods. However, if discounting
is quasi-geometric, (β  =1 ) ,t h ee ﬀective discount factor is an endogenous
variable, which depends on the state of the agent. In this section, we illus-
trate some properties of such an endogenous discount factor. We employ a
simplifying assumption that the borrowing limit is never reached.3
In the absence of borrowing restrictions, the quasi-geometric Euler equa-
tion holds with equality and can be re-written as
u
  (ct)=δt+1 (1 + r)Et [u
  (ct+1)], (9)
where δt+1 is an ”eﬀective discount factor”, deﬁned as
δt+1 ≡ δt+1 (at+1,s t+1)=δ ·
 
1 −
1 − β
1+r
·
Et [u  (ct+1)C1 (at+1,s t+1)]
Et [u  (ct+1)]
 
. (10)
3At the point where the borrowing constraint begins to bind, the consumption function
has a kink and, therefore, is not continuously diﬀerentiable.
8If β =1 ,t h e nδt+1 = δ for all t ∈ T and condition (9) reduces to the standard
Euler equation. Before we characterize the properties of δt+1 under β  =1 ,
let us establish one useful result regarding the consumption function.
Lemma 1 C (a,s) is strictly increasing in a for all a ∈ A, s ∈S.
Proof. See appendix A.  
The proof of Lemma 1 relies on the assumption that a solution to the Euler
equation (8) exists, it is unique and that the value function W is continuously
diﬀerentiable. All of these properties were satisﬁed in our simulations, when
β was suﬃciently close to one. In general, the properties of the solution to
the studied model are not known.4
The implication of this result for the discount factor δt+1 is as follows:
Proposition 1 If β  1,t h e nδt+1  δ for all a ∈ A, s ∈S.
Proof. Under the assumption that u  is strictly increasing and with the
result of Lemma 1, the proof of Proposition 1 follows from (10) directly.  
Consider ﬁrst the case β < 1. Proposition 1 shows that under such
quasi-geometric discounting, the agent has the discount factor δt+1 < δ and
therefore, is less patient than that with β =1 . Precisely what determines
the patience of the agent? Two factors are relevant here. First, self t is
impatient (δt+1 < δ), because she is the short-run impatient, i.e., she has
the short-run discount factor βδ, which is lower than the long-run discount
factor δ. Second, self t is impatient because the subsequent self t +1is the
short-run impatient. To see the point, consider the ﬁrst-order condition of
the problem (4)−(7) with respect to consumption. Self t+1’s choice of ct+1
is determined by the short-run discount factor βδ
u
  (ct+1)=δEt+1V1 (at+2,s t+2).
For self t, however, the discount factor between periods t+1and t+2is the
long-run one, δ, and thus, the values of consumption and assets for self t at
4F o ras i m i l a rm o d e lw i t hiid shocks, Harris and Laibson (2001) prove the existence of
equilibrium and provide some general results regarding the continuity and diﬀerentiability
of the value and policy functions.
9period t +1are related as:
u
  (ct+1) > δEt+1V1 (at+2,s t+2).
Given that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, from the per-
spective of self t, self t +1overconsumes. The fact that a part of savings is
misused by self t+1,m a k e ss e l ft to save less, i.e., to act impatiently. On the
contrary, if β > 1, self t acts very patiently because, ﬁrst, she is patient in
the short-run (has the short run-discount factor βδ, which is higher than the
long-run discount factor δ) and second, she aims to, at least partially, oﬀset
underconsumption of too-patient self t +1 .
The assumption of quasi-geometric discounting has another important
implication: the eﬀective discount factor δt+1 depends on the agent’s wealth.
By ﬁnding a partial derivative of δt+1 with respect to at+1 from (10) and
omitting the arguments for the sake of compactness, we can write
∂δt+1
∂at+1
= −
δ(1 − β)
1+r
·
Et [u  C2
1 + u C11]Et [u ] − Et [u C1]Et [u  C1]
Et [u ]
2 , (11)
where C11 ≡ C11 (at+1,s t+1) is the second order partial derivative of C with
respect to the ﬁrst argument. Consider a non-stochastic steady state of (9)
and (10) such that st = s, ct = c and at = a for all t. By evaluating (11) in
the steady state, we get
∂δ(a,s)
∂a
= −
δ(1 − β)
1+r
· C11 (a,s). (12)
Hence, if the consumption function is strictly concave, C11 < 0, then the
endogenous discount factor of short-run impatient (patient) consumers is
strictly increasing (decreasing) in wealth, at least near the steady state.5
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ee ﬀective discount factor of agents depends on wealth
can play a potentially important role in the model’s distributive predictions.
We shall recall that under the standard geometric discounting (β =1 ) ,t h e
model severely underpredicts the wealth of the rich and overpredicts the
5Carroll and Kimbal (1996) prove analytically that introducing labor income uncer-
tainty into a similar ﬁnite-horizon problem with standard geometric discounting, β =1 ,
and with no restrictions on borrowing induces a concave consumption function. The proof
of a parallel result for our setup is beyond the scope of this paper. In our simulations, the
consumption function was concave under all parameterization considered.
10wealth of the poor agents (see, e.g., Aiyagari, 1994, Quadrini and Ríos-
Rull, 1997). Note that the assumption of quasi-geometric discounting can
help us to improve on the above shortcoming. Speciﬁcally, if β < 1,t h e
rich act more patiently (have a higher discount factor) than the poor. As
a result, the diﬀerence between the rich and the poor will be larger in the
economy with β < 1 than in the one with β =1 , where the rich and the
poor are equally patient. In the remainder of the paper, we shall evaluate
the eﬀects associated with the assumption of quasi-geometric discounting by
using numerical methods.
3 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we describe the calibration and solution procedures and dis-
cuss the numerical results.
3.1 Calibration and solution procedures
The model’s period is one year. The long-run discount factor is set at δ =
0.96. We assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, F (K,N)=
KαN1−α, with a capital share set at α =0 .36. The depreciation rate of
capital d is equal to 0.08. The debt limit is set at zero, b =0 .
We assume that the momentary utility function is u(c)=c1−γ−1
1−γ , where
γ is a constant coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. As in Aiyagari (1994), we
assume that idiosyncratic shocks follow an AR(1) process given by
logst+1 = ρlogst + σ
 
1 − ρ
2 1/2 εt+1, εt+1 ∼ N (0,1),
where ρ ∈ [0,1] is the autocorrelation coeﬃcient, and σ ≥ 0 is the uncondi-
tional standard deviation of the variable logst.
We consider four alternative sets of values of
(γ,ρ,σ) ∈ {(1.0,0.6,0.2), (1.0,0.9,0.2), (3.0,0.9,0.2), (1.0,0.9,0.4)}.
We assume three alternative values of β ∈ {0.8, 1.0, 1.2}, which correspond
to the cases of short-run impatience, equal short- and long-run patience and
short-run patience, respectively.
11As we argued in section 2.3, the presence of quasi-geometric discount-
i n gi nt h em o d e lh a st w oe ﬀects. First, the eﬀective discount factor of the
agent decreases if β < 1 (increases if β > 1) compared to the standard case
β =1 . Second, the eﬀective discount factor is not a constant, as in the
standard case, but a function of the individual state (at,s t).T od i s t i n g u i s h
between the above eﬀects, we compute the average eﬀective discount fac-
tor for each considered economy by using (10). (Such discount factors are
denoted by E (δt|β =0 .8) and E (δt|β =1 .2) for the economies with short-
run impatient and short-run patient consumers, respectively.) We then use
the average eﬀective discount factors obtained from the models with quasi-
geometric discounting for calibrating the model with standard geometric dis-
counting. Thus, for each parameterization (γ,ρ,σ),w er e p o r tﬁve simulation
experiments: three experiments under δ =0 .96 and β ∈ {0.8, 1.0, 1.2} and
two experiments under β =1 .0 and δ ∈ {E (δt|β =0 .8), E (δt|β =1 .2)}.
To solve the model, we use an algorithm iterating on the Euler equation.
The description of the algorithm is provided in appendix B.6 In the bench-
mark geometric discounting case (β =1 ) , the algorithm had no diﬃculty in
computing the solution. Under quasi-geometric discounting (β  =1 ) ,h o w -
ever, the convergence was more costly to achieve. In several experiments, it
was necessary to search for a good initial guess for interest rate r and then
slowly update the decision rules. Furthermore, the algorithm typically failed
to converge when β was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, speciﬁcally, when
β was out of the range [0.8,1.2]. The computational problems described,
however, do not appear to be speciﬁc to our solution method.7
6Maliar and Maliar (2002) study the convergence properties of this and other Euler
equation methods in the context of models with quasi-geometric discounting. The method
used in the present paper is shown to yield the same solutions as those obtained by the
perturbation method proposed by Krusell, Kuru¸ sçu and Smith (2002).
7The diﬃculties in ﬁnding numerical solutions have been reported in other papers
on quasi-geometric discounting. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998) study a ﬁnite-
horizon model similar to ours and also ﬁnd that solution can be computed only if β is not
too low (they use β =0 .85). In the context of a deterministic version of the neoclassical
growth model with quasi-geometric discounting, Krusell and Smith (2000) argue that
numerical problems are related to the fact that in addition to a smooth interior solution,
the model has inﬁnitely many discontinuous solutions.
123.2 Results
Figure 1 plots the stationary probability distributions of shocks and assets
(wealth) in the models under β ∈ {0.8,1.0,1.2} and δ =0 .96.T w ot e n d e n -
cies are evident here. First, the unconditional mean of wealth distribution
increases in β. Second, the fraction of the liquidity-constrained population
declines in β.T h a ti s ,t h ea g e n t sw h oa r es h o r t - r u ni m p a t i e n t ,β =0 .8,a r e
much more likely to be at binding liquidity constraints than those who are
short-run patient, β =1 .2.
Table 1 summarizes the statistics on the wealth distribution generated
by the model economies. We report two measures of wealth inequality: the
Gini coeﬃcient and the percentages of wealth held by diﬀerent groups of the
population. For the sake of comparison, we also provide the corresponding
statistics on the U.S. economy.
We must ﬁrst note that the model with standard geometric discounting
(β =1 )cannot generate the realistic relative degrees of wealth inequality.
To be more speciﬁc ,t h ep o o ra g e n t sa r en o ts op o o ra n dt h er i c ha g e n t sa r e
not so rich in the model as they are in the data. For instance, in the model,
under γ =1 .0, ρ =0 .6, σ =0 .2 (the ﬁrst panel in the table), the bottom
40% of the population holds 17% of total wealth and the upper 1% of the
population holds 3.1% of total wealth, whereas in the U.S. economy, these
numbers are 2.2% and 28.2%, respectively. The Gini coeﬃcient reﬂects the
same tendency: it is much lower in the model (0.33) than in the data (0.76).
Variations in the parameters γ, ρ, σ (the remaining three panels in the table)
can help to generate a higher concentration of wealth in the model, however,
the improvements are not suﬃcient to account for the data.
We now analyze the case of quasi-geometric discounting. As we mentioned
before, the consumption function proved to be concave in our simulations
which implies that under the assumption of short-run impatience β < 1
(patience β > 1), wealth inequality increases (decreases) in comparison to
the one under the equal short- and long-run patience, β =1 . The results in
Table 1 make it possible to appreciate the quantitative expressions of these
eﬀects. For example, if β =0 .8 and γ =1 .0, ρ =0 .6, σ =0 .2, the model
predicts that the wealth holdings of the poorest 40% of the population are
12.0% and those of the richest 1% of the population are 3.5%, (i.e., declines
by 29% and increases by 13%, respectively, compared to the corresponding
statistics in the benchmark case β =1 .0); similarly, the Gini coeﬃcient rises
to 0.39 (i.e., increases by 18%). On the contrary, if β =1 .2, the fraction
13  15
Table 1. Selected statistics of the wealth distribution in the U.S. and artificial economies. 
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δ  
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0-40% 
 
80-
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90-
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95-
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99-
100% 
            
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.6  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8  0.9600  0.39 12.0 42.2 10.4 10.4  3.5 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9492  0.34  16.9  38.9  9.7  9.5  3.1 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  0.33  17.0  38.6  9.5  9.5  3.1 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9693  0.33  17.0  38.1  9.5  9.4  3.1 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  0.23  22.8  31.2  8.1  7.5  2.3 
            
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8 0.9600  0.45  8.9  45.5  11.7  11.6  3.9 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0  0.9486  0.43 10.0 43.4 11.1 10.9  3.7 
Geometric   1.0  0.9600  0.42 12.4 44.1 11.1 11.0  3.7 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0  0.9694  0.41 12.5 43.1 11.1 11.0  3.7 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  0.33  17.7  37.2  9.5  9.2  2.9 
            
γ  = 3.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8  0.9600  0.43 10.6 43.7 11.1 11.0  3.7 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0  0.9475  0.40 12.1 42.2 10.6 10.6  3.5 
Geometric   1.0  0.9600  0.40 13.9 42.4 10.7 10.5  3.5 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0  0.9693  0.39 14.0 41.5 10.7 10.5  3.4 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  0.36  15.7  39.6  10.1  9.7  3.2 
            
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.4          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8 0.9600  0.47  9.7  48.6  12.0  12.6  4.4 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9426  0.46  8.9  46.9  11.8  12.2  4.2 
Geometric   1.0  0.9600  0.45 10.4 46.6 11.7 12.0  4.1 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0  0.9728  0.44 10.2 46.3 11.6 11.7  4.0 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2  0.9600  0.41 13.3 43.2 11.0 11.0  3.6 
           
U.S. economy 
(a)  0.76  2.2  77.1 12.6 23.1 28.2 
 
(a)Source: Quadrini and Ríos-Rule (1997).of wealth held by the bottom 40% of the population is 22.8% and that held
by the top 1% of the population is 2.3% (i.e., increases by 34% and declines
by 26%, respectively, compared to the case β =1 .0); the Gini coeﬃcient
goes down to 0.23 (i.e., declines by 30%) .T h es a m er e g u l a r i t i e sa r eo b s e r v e d
under the other parameterizations of (γ,ρ,σ).
As we can see from Table 1, the predictions of the standard model with
geometric discounting do not signiﬁcantly depend on the value of δ assumed
(compare the cases δ ∈ {0.96,E (δt|β =0 .8), E (δt|β =1 .2)}). We there-
fore conclude that the eﬀect of quasi-geometric discounting on the degrees
of wealth inequality in the model comes mostly from the endogenous depen-
dence of the individual eﬀective discount factor on the individual state and
not from the diﬀerences in the average discount factor across the models.
In Table2, we include the same statistics on the income distribution, as
we previously did for the wealth distribution. As one can see, in the U.S.
economy, there is much less dispersion across individuals in income compared
with wealth. All model economies are capable of reproducing this regularity,
but, again, they dramatically underpredict the degrees of income inequality.
The main point to note from the table is that the role of quasi-geometric
discounting in the income distribution is quite modest.
The results in Table 3 allow us to quantify the eﬀect of quasi-geometric
discounting on the aggregate savings. We can see the tendencies by compar-
ing, e.g., the ﬁrst three rows of the ﬁrst panel, γ =1 .0, ρ =0 .6, σ =0 .2.T h e
aggregate capital stock in the economy with quasi-geometric short-run impa-
tient agents (β =0 .8) is 12.55% lower than that in the economy with geomet-
ric agents (β =1 .0). The diﬀerence between the capital stocks in the models
with geometric discounting (β =1 .0) under δ = E (δt|β =0 .8) = 0.9492 and
δ =0 .96 is even larger: it amounts to 13.26%. We therefore conclude the
following: The reduction in the average eﬀective discount factor due to quasi-
geometric discounting decreases the aggregate savings, but the endogeneity
of the eﬀective discount factor actually increases the aggregate savings. Un-
der our benchmark parametrization, the increase in the aggregate savings
due to the latter eﬀect is relatively small,  Kβ =0 .71%, however, under
other parametrizations, such an increase can be quite sizable. For example,
under γ =1 .0, ρ =0 .9, σ =0 .4, β =0 .8,w eh a v e Kβ =7 .06%.W h y
does the endogeneity of the eﬀective discount factor raises the aggregate cap-
ital stock of the economy with quasi-geometric short-run impatient agents?
In section 2.3, we conjectured that with the concave consumption function,
the individual eﬀective discount factor of the agent with β < 1 increases in
16  17
Table 2. Selected statistics of the income distribution in the U.S. and artificial economies. 
 
   
 
β  
 
δ  
 
Gini 
 
0-40% 
 
80-
100% 
 
90-
95% 
 
95-
99% 
 
99-
100% 
           
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.6  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8 0.9600  0.13  31.2  26.9  6.7  6.0  1.8 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9492  0.12  31.4  26.5  6.6  5.9  1.7 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  0.12  31.8  26.5  6.6  5.9  1.7 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9693  0.12  32.0  26.3  6.5  5.9  1.7 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  0.12  32.2  26.2  6.5  5.8  1.7 
             
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8 0.9600  0.14  30.6  27.4  6.9  6.1  1.8 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9486  0.14  30.7  27.3  6.9  6.1  1.7 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  0.13  31.1  27.0  6.8  6.0  1.7 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9694  0.13  31.4  26.8  6.8  5.9  1.7 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  0.12  31.6  26.6  6.7  5.9  1.6 
             
γ  = 3.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8 0.9600  0.13  30.9  27.2  6.9  6.0  1.7 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9475  0.13  30.8  27.1  6.9  6.0  1.7 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  0.13  31.4  26.8  6.8  5.9  1.7 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9693  0.12  31.6  26.6  6.7  5.9  1.6 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  0.12  31.6  26.6  6.7  5.9  1.6 
             
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.4          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8 0.9600  0.23  24.8  33.2  8.4  8.0  2.3 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9426  0.23  24.6  33.5  8.4  8.1  2.3 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  0.23  24.9  33.3  8.3  8.1  2.3 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9728  0.23  25.1  33.1  8.3  8.1  2.3 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  0.23  25.1  33.2  8.3  8.0  2.3 
           
U.S. economy 
(a)  0.51 10.3 53.6 10.7 13.5 14.1 
 
 (a)Source: Quadrini and Ríos-Rule (1997).     18
Table 3. Equilibrium interest rate and aggregate capital in the artificial economies. 
 
   
 
β  
 
δ  
 
r,% 
 
K 
 
∆ K, % 
 
∆ K
β , % 
 
K
ss 
 
PS, % 
           
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.6  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8  0.9600  5.05 4.88  -12.55  0.71 4.79 1.88 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9492  5.12  4.84 -13.26    4.71  2.76 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  3.98  5.58  0.0    5.45  2.38 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9693  3.02  6.36 13.98    6.23  2.09 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  3.09  6.30 12.90 -1.08 5.97  5.53 
             
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8  0.9600  4.97 4.93  -12.43  1.42 4.79 2.92 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9486  5.11  4.85 -13.85    4.67  3.85 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  3.91  5.63  0.0    5.45  3.30 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9694  2.93  6.44 14.39    6.24  3.21 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  3.05  6.33 12.43 -1.96 5.97  6.03 
             
γ  = 3.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.2          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8  0.9600  4.21 5.42  -11.29  3.44 4.79  13.15 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9475  4.52  5.21 -14.73    4.61 13.01 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  3.31  6.11  0.0    5.45 12.11 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9693  2.44  6.92 13.26    6.23 11.08 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  2.63  6.73 10.15 -3.11 5.97 12.73 
             
γ  = 1.0  ρ  = 0.9  σ  = 0.4          
Quasi-geometric impatient  0.8  0.9600  4.40 5.29  -13.14  7.06 4.79  10.44 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =0.8)  1.0 0.9426  5.09  4.86 -20.20    4.33 12.24 
Geometric   1.0 0.9600  3.33  6.09  0.0    5.45 11.74 
Geometric, δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)  1.0 0.9728  2.09  7.30 19.87    6.57 11.11 
Quasi-geometric patient  1.2 0.9600  2.38  6.98 14.61 -5.26 5.97 16.92 
 
Notes: Statistic ∆ K is the percentage difference between the capital stock in the raw and the one in the 
geometric-discounting case β =1.0 and δ =0.96; ∆ K
β  is the difference between ∆ K for the quasi-geometric-
discounting case with β =0.8 and δ =0.96 (β =1.2 and δ =0.96) and ∆ K for the geometric-discounting case 
with β =1.0 and δ =E(δ t|β =0.8) (β =1.0 and δ =E(δ t|β =1.2)); K
ss is the capital stock in the steady state of 
the deterministic version of the model; and PS, % is precautionary savings, which are defined as the 
percentage difference between the capital stocks in the stochastic and deterministic models.  wealth. As a result, the savings rate of the rich increases, and that of the
poor decreases. Since the aggregate amount of savings is mainly determined
by the rich, this pushes the aggregate capital stock up. With quasi-geometric
short-run patient agents (β =1 .2), all the tendencies are reversed.
In Table 3, we also report the amount of precautionary savings, PS, %,
which are deﬁned as the percentage diﬀerence between the capital stock in the
stochastic economy, K, and the one in the associated deterministic economy,
Kss.T h e m a i n ﬁnding here is that the diﬀerence in precautionary savings
across the models in each panel is relatively small. This is in contrast to the
result of Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998) that under the low values
of β (speciﬁcally, they use β =0 .85), the presence of quasi-geometric dis-
counting leads to the missing precautionary savings eﬀect.8 The discrepancy
between the results of Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998) and ours is ex-
plained by the fact that in their model, the interest rate is given exogenously,
whereas, in our model, it is determined endogenously. In a general equilib-
rium setup like ours, the agents’ willingness to save more (less) drives the
interest rate down (up), which, in turn, decreases (increases) the incentives
to save. Precisely this mitigates the eﬀect of quasi-geometric discounting on
precautionary savings.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The standard one-sector growth model with a large number of agents subject
to uninsured idiosyncratic shocks predicts substantially less wealth inequal-
ity than what is observed in the data. One way of generating more skewness
i nt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fw e a l t hi st oa s s u m et h a ta g e n t sd i ﬀer in patience (dis-
count factors), e.g., Krusell and Smith (1995, 1998) and Carroll (2000). In
the paper, we argue that the introduction of quasi-geometric discounting can
have the same eﬀect on the equilibrium as postulating heterogeneity in the
discount factors. This is because the eﬀective discount factor becomes an
endogenous state-dependent variable. In particular, if agents are short-run
impatient, then the eﬀective discount factor increases in wealth, which ac-
centuates the diﬀerences between the saving rates of rich and poor agents.
8The empirical ﬁndings about the importance of a precautionary savings motive are
mixed. For example, Carroll (1994), Carroll and Samwick (1997) ﬁnd strong evidence of
precautionary savings, while Dynan (1993), Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992) report
the missing precautionary savings eﬀect.
19The consequence is that the model with quasi-geometric short-run impa-
tient agents produces a larger dispersion of wealth than does the standard
geometric-discounting setup. We evaluate the eﬀects associated with quasi-
geometric discounting in a calibrated version of the model. We ﬁnd that such
eﬀects are quantitatively signiﬁcant but not suﬃcient in order the model can
account for the degrees of wealth and income inequalities in the data.
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5 Appendices
Appendix A contains the proof to Lemma 1. Appendix B presents a descrip-
tion of the computational algorithm.
5.1 Appendix A
Proof to Lemma 1. Denote u(ct)=u((1 + r)at + wst − at+1) ≡ u(at,a t+1).
We ﬁrst prove that the asset function A(at,s t) is strictly increasing in at.
For any two levels of current wealth a1
t and a2
t and the corresponding next
period’s wealth a1
t+1 = A(a1
t,s t) and a2
t+1 = A(a2
t,s t),w eh a v e
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On adding up these equations and rearranging the terms, we obtain
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.
The strict concavity of the utility function implies that if a1
t >a 2
t, then
a1
t+1 >a 2
t+1, i.e., that A(at,s t) is strictly increasing in at.
In order to prove that the consumption function C (at,s t) is strictly in-
creasing in at, we use the results that the optimal value function W (at,s t)
is strictly increasing and strictly concave in at.
T h ef a c tt h a tW is strictly increasing in at follows from the assumption
of the strictly increasing utility function u and by the deﬁnition of
W (at,s t)=m a x
at+1
{u((1 + r)at + wst − at+1)+βδEt [V (at+1,s t+1)]}.
22The strict concavity of W can be shown as follows: Fix a sequence of
realizations for shocks (st,s t+1,...) ∈ S. Consider a1
t and a2
t such that a1
t >a 2
t.
By using the asset function A(at,s t) iteratively, we ﬁnd the corresponding
optimal sequences for assets
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fact that A(at,s t) is strictly increasing in at implies that a1
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τ ≥ t.
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To complete the proof, we ﬁn dt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fW from (4) − (6)
W1 (at,s t)=u
  (C (at,s t))(1 + r).
T h ef a c tt h a tW is strictly increasing and strictly concave in at implies that
C (at,s t) is strictly increasing in at.  
235.2 Appendix B
To compute the equilibrium, we approximate the autoregressive process for
the shocks by a seven-state Markov chain, as in Aiyagari (1994). For each
state s ∈ {s1,...,s7}, we parametrize the asset demand by a function of the
current asset holdings.9 The grid for asset holdings consists of 100 equally
spaced points in the range [amin,a max],w h e r eamin ≡ b =0and amax is
the maximum sustainable capital stock (i.e., the solution to f (a)=da).
To evaluate the asset function outside the grid, we use cubic polynomial
interpolation.
We employ the algorithm, which iterates on the Euler equation. By sub-
stituting consumption from the Euler equation (8) in budget constraint (6),
we obtain
a
  =( 1+r)a + ws− (13)
−



δ
 
s∈{s1,...,s7}
 
(1 + r − (1 − β)C1 (A(a,s),s  ))
(A(a,s)(1+r)+ws  − A(A(a,s),s  ))
γ
 
· Prob(s
  | s)



−1/γ
.
Consequently, we implement the following iterative procedure:
• Step 1. Fix some asset function on the grid, A(a,s) and compute the
corresponding consumption function C (a,s) from budget constraint
(6).
• Step 2. Use the decision rules to calculate the right side of the Euler
equation (13) in each point on the grid. The left side of the Euler
equation will be the new asset function,
∼
A(a,s).
• Step 3. Compute the asset function for next iteration
≈
A(a,s) by using
the updating:
≈
A(a,s)=η
∼
A(a,s)+( 1− η)A(a,s), η ∈ (0,1].
9The borrowing restriction on assets used in our paper, a  ≥ 0, is not equivalent to the
one in Aiyagari (1994). In the latter paper, the restriction is imposed on total resources.
These are restricted to being no lower than the wage corresponding to an interest rate
equal to the time preference rate (the highest possible interest rate under β =1 ). Such
restriction on the total resources would not be appropriate if discounting is quasi-geometric
(β  =1 ) , as the equilibrium interest rate can be either higher and or lower than the time
preference rate.
24For each point, such that
≈
A(a,s) does not belong to [amin,a max],s e t
≈
A(a,s) at the corresponding boundary value.
• Iterate on Steps 1 − 3 until
≈
A(a,s)=A(a,s) with a given precision.
In the stochastic case, we compute the interest rate and wage correspond-
ing to the given asset function A(a,s) by using invariant probability distri-
bution of shocks and assets, as described in Rios-Rull (1999):
Prob(a
 ,s
 )=
 
s∈{s1,...,s7}
Prob
 
A
−1 (a
 ,s),s
 
· Prob(s
  | s)
where A−1 (a ,s)={a, a  = A(a,s)} is the inverse of the asset function. To
compute the interest rate and wage corresponding to the given asset function
in the deterministic economy, we solve for a ﬁxed point satisfying the property
A(a∗,1) = a∗.
Finally, to solve for the equilibrium (the stochastic steady state), we use
the bisection method as in Aiyagari (1994).
25